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'Glance
The position of sheriff in
Alabama seems to be a
hybrid. On the one hand,
there is much to suggest
that sheriffs are the chief '
law enforcement officers 'i'
for their respective coun-
ties; on the other hand,
they are denominated
state officers by the
Alabama constitution.
In this case, the Supreme
Court is asked to decide
which designation
matters. If the former,
Monroe County,
Alabama, can be held
liable for its sheriff's
action in convicting an
innocent man of murder;
if the latter, the County
is off the hook.
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$" Section 1 of the Civil Rights
(Ku Klux Klan) Act of 1871, now
found at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section
1983"), permits an individual whose
federal rights have been violated to
sue for damages. (Refer to Glossary
for the definition of damages.)
The Supreme Court ruled almost
20 years ago that the word "person"
in Section 1983 included local gov-
ernments as well as individuals.
Monell v. Department of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
However, in declaring that local
governments could be liable under
Section 1983 for violating an indi-
vidual's federal rights, the Court
declined to base liability on a theory
of respondeat superior, i.e., an
employer's liability for certain
unlawful acts of its employees.
Instead, the Court ruled that local
governments are subject to Section
1983 liability only when the alleged
injury is the result of "execution of
a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official
policy." 438 U.S. at 694.
Monell did not provide a precise for-
mula by which to identify "those
whose edicts or acts . . represent
official policy." And subsequent
cases that have reached the
Supreme Court have dealt primarily
with the question of whether or not
a particular local government offi-
cial or employee possessed the
requisite policymaking authority.
Less explored has been the question
of which officials with policymaking
authority can fairly be said to repre-
sent local government as opposed
to state government. Making such
a determination is the focus of
this case.
ISSUE
Are Alabama sheriffs final policy-
makers in matters of law enforce-
ment for their respective counties
for purposes of governmental
liability under Section 1983?
FACTS
In 1988 Walter McMillian was sen-
tenced to death for the murder of a
woman in Monroe County, Alabama.
Five years later, his conviction was
overturned by the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals on the ground
that Alabama law enforcement offi-
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cials had unlawfully concealed
exculpatory evidence supporting his
innocence. 616 So. 2d 933 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993). Shortly there-
after, all charges against McMillian
were dismissed. On March 3, 1993,
he was released from prison after
having served nearly six years on
Alabama's death row, including
more than a year on death row
between the time of his arrest and
trial on murder charges.
McMillian subsequently filed a
Section 1983 action in federal
district court, naming as defendants
Monroe County, Monroe County
Sheriff Tom Tate, and a number of
county and state officials who
McMillian alleged were responsible
for his arrest, imprisonment, and
conviction. According to McMillian's
complaint, Sheriff Tate arrested him
without cause; subjected him to
racial slurs, threats, and insults
(Tate is white, McMillian is African
American); knowingly suppressed
exculpatory evidence pointing
toward his innocence; intimidated
witnesses into giving false testimony
implicating him; testified falsely
before a grand jury; and conspired
to place him on death row prior
to trial.
Monroe County was sued on the
ground that it was liable for Sheriff
Tate's unconstitutional actions
because they represented the
official policy of Monroe County
in matters of law enforcement.
McMillian's complaint also alleged
that Tate's actions were taken pur-
suant to an unwritten policy and
custom of Monroe County to "insti-
gate unwarranted and malicious
criminal prosecutions" and to
engage in the kinds of misconduct
of which Tate was accused.
The district court, in an unpub-
lished opinion, granted Monroe
County's motion to dismiss the
claim against it. The court agreed
with the County's argument that
under the Alabama constitution a
sheriff is a state, not county, official
and, as such, does not exercise poli-
cymaking authority for the county
when enforcing the law.
McMillian appealed the dismissal
order to the Eleventh Circuit which
affirmed. 88 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir.
1996). According to the Eleventh
Circuit, Alabama counties have no
law enforcement authority, and an
Alabama sheriff "does not exercise
county power when he engages in
law enforcement activities."
88 F.3d at 1578.
McMillian responded by filing a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court which was granted.
117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
CASE ANALYSIS
This case raises the question of the
role of state constitutional arrange-
ments in determining local govern-
mental liability under Section 1983.
As mentioned above, it is now firm-
ly established that local governmen-
tal bodies may be sued under
Section 1983 if the alleged injury is
inflicted pursuant to governmental
policy or custom, whether put into
place by its lawmakers or by those
with policymaking authority.
Moreover, all parties agree that the
county sheriff has final policymak-
ing authority over law enforcement
activities at the county level in
Alabama. What is at issue is
whether, under Alabama law, the
sheriff exercises that authority on
behalf of county government or
state government.
The basic issue of whether a county
sheriff is an official policymaker for
county government has been litigat-
ed in many states. In Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 746 F.2d 337
(6th Cir. 1984), affd, 475 U.S. 469
(1986) (plurality opinion), the Sixth
Circuit, applying Ohio law, conclud-
ed that local governments are
potentially liable for the unconstitu-
tional actions of county sheriffs.
(Refer to Glossary for the definition
of plurality opinion.) In so holding,
the Sixth Circuit relied on evidence
that county residents elected the
sheriff; that the county paid the
sheriff's salary and provided the
budget for the office; that the coun-
ty provided the sheriff with office
space and law enforcement equip-
ment; and that the sheriff was the
chief law enforcement officer in
each Ohio county.
Other circuit courts have reached
similar conclusions with respect
to the status of sheriffs in
Massachusetts, Maryland, Texas,
Michigan, and Oklahoma. See
Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556
(1st Cir. 1985); Dotson v. Chester,
937 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1991);
Thrner v. Upton County, Texas,
915 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1990);
Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181
(6th Cir. 1985). Only with regard to
Wisconsin has a circuit court
reached a decision similar to that of
the Eleventh Circuit in this case.
Soderbeck v. Burnett County,
Wisconsin, 752 F.2d 285, 292-93
(7th Cir. 1985) (county not liable
under Section 1983 when the plain-
tiff "made no effort to show that the
sheriff is a policymaking official of
the county government").
In rejecting the argument that the
Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Pembaur
and the similar reasoning of other
circuit courts is dispositive, the
Eleventh Circuit focused on the spe-
cific status and role of the office of
sheriff under Alabama law, especially
focusing on two facts. First, under
Alabama law, counties have no law
enforcement responsibilities; second,
under the Alabama constitution,
sheriffs are state rather than county
officers. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 112.
(Continued on Page 374)
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The first fact relied on by the
Eleventh Circuit is the structure of
the county-state relationship in
Alabama. County governments in
Alabama exercise only that authori-
ty explicitly granted to them by the
Alabama legislature, i.e., they have
no home rule powers. According to
the court, because no specific
Alabama statute or constitutional
provision grants law enforcement
authority to county governments,
those governments have none.
Instead, law enforcement authority
is granted to sheriffs by a statutory
provision which declares it to be the
"duty of sheriffs in their respective
counties, by themselves or deputies,
to ferret out crime, to apprehend
and arrest criminals and, insofar as
is within their power, to gather evi-
dence of crimes in their counties."
ALA. CODE § 36-22-3(4) (1991).
The second fact relied on by the
Eleventh Circuit is the State's con-
stitution which explicitly provides
that sheriffs are state officers and
part of Alabama's executive depart-
ment. ("The executive department
shall consist of a governor, lieu-
tenant governor, attorney-general,
state auditor, secretary of state,
state treasurer, superintendent
of education, commissioner of
agriculture and industries, and a
sheriff for each county." ALA. CONST.
art. V, § 112.)
The court found further support for
its holding that Alabama sheriffs are
not county officials in the fact that
they are protected by the Alabama
constitution's grant of sovereign
immunity, ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
Moreover, under Alabama personal
injury law, sheriffs cannot create
respondeat superior liability for the
counties in which they operate.
Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586
So. 2d 209 (Ala. 1991).
McMillian contends that these
distinctions in no meaningful way
differentiate Alabama sheriffs from
sheriffs in other states. As already
pointed out, several federal circuit
courts of appeals have held that the
mere fact that a sheriffs law
enforcement decisions are nonre-
viewable by other members of coun-
ty government does not mean that
the sheriff is not a final policymaker
for the county in law enforcement
matters. In addition, McMillian
insists that the Eleventh Circuit
erred in concluding that Alabama
counties have no law enforcement
role, citing the counties' role in
funding law enforcement activities
and the participation of other coun-
ty officials, including the coroner, in
certain aspects of the law enforce-
ment process.
In regard to the status of the office
of sheriff, McMillian maintains that
the Alabama constitution's identifi-
cation of the sheriff as a state
official and the county's lack of
accountability for a sheriffs actions
under the State's personal injury
law should not be controlling on the
issue of a sheriffs status as a county
official. He argues that in almost all
other respects, Alabama sheriffs
function as county officials. Here,
McMillian observes that sheriffs are
treated as county rather than state
officials in a variety of state
statutes, e.g., ALA CODE § 17-8-5
(pertaining to electoral ballots and
referring to sheriffs as county offi-
cials); he also notes that sheriffs
have been referred to as county
officials in several decisions of the
Alabama Supreme Court. Moreover,
McMillian maintains that since
Alabama sheriffs are elected by
county residents, receive their fund-
ing and financing from the county
treasury, and have jurisdiction only
within the boundaries of the county,
there is no reasonable conclusion
except that they are county officials.
In its prior decisions involving the
question of who is a final policy-
maker for purposes of local govern-
mental liability under Section 1983,
the Supreme Court has failed to
articulate a clear test for classifying
local officials as either having or not
having final policymaking authority.
While the Court has employed what
could be described as a functional
analysis of policymaking authority,
it has emphasized that state law
ordinarily determines which
officials have final policymaking
authority. For example, in City of
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 124-25 (1988) (plurality opin-
ion), the Court's plurality noted that
"the states have extremely wide lati-
tude in determining the form that
local government takes, and local
preferences have led to a profusion
of distinct forms. Among the many
kinds of municipal corporations,
political subdivisions, and special
districts of all sorts, one may expect
to find a rich variety of ways in
which the power of government is
distributed among a host of different
officials and official bodies." Monroe
County relies on this and similar
observations of the Court in its
Section 1983 cases to insist that
Tate was not a policymaker for the
County in this case.
As a practical matter, however, the
office of sheriff in Alabama does not
differ significantly from the office of
sheriff in other states. In functional
terms, one would be hard-pressed to
explain how a sheriff who is a state
official with exclusive law enforce-
ment authority for a single county,
as in Alabama, performs a function
different from that of a sheriff who
is the law enforcement policymaker
for a particular county government,
as in most states. Nevertheless, as a
matter of Alabama constitutional
law, sheriffs are state rather than
county officials. (The reasons for
this are historical. Alabama sheriffs
were classified as state officials by
Issue No. 6374
the Alabama Constitution of 1901 in
order to make them more account-
able to state authority. The change
was prompted by the widespread
belief that sheriffs had acquiesced to
mob violence and that local govern-
ment had failed to punish sheriffs
for neglect of duty which resulted in
an "excessive number of lynching
cases in Alabama." Parker v.
Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 443-44
(Ala. 1987).)
If the Supreme Court chooses to
overturn the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit in this case, it will
probably do so on the ground that
the state official/county official dis-
tinction relied upon by the Eleventh
Circuit is purely formal and pro-
vides no good reason for immuniz-
ing a county government from liabil-
ity in cases such as this one. To
hold that a county sheriff who pos-
sesses final policymaking authority
in the area of law enforcement is
acting on behalf of the county for
purposes of county governmental
liability under Section 1983 would
be consistent with the tenor of the
Court's Section 1983 decisions over
the past three decades. If, on the
other hand, the Court decides to
uphold the Eleventh Circuit's deci-
sion, it will most likely rely on the
special status of sheriffs under
Alabama constitutional and statuto-
ry law, rather than on the failure of
Alabama law to explicitly delegate
law enforcement responsibilities to
county governments.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case will have its greatest
significance if the Supreme Court
upholds the lower court decision on
the narrow ground that Alabama
sheriffs are state, not local, officials.
Although that result would have no
immediate effect outside Alabama
(and those other states, if there are
any, that define a sheriff as a state
official), such a holding could be
read by the states as an invitation to
immunize county and municipal
governments from Section 1983 lia-
bility by reclassifying local govern-
mental officials as state officials.
Taken to its extreme, that approach
could significantly undercut the
effect of Monell and its progeny.
That any state would choose to
respond in this way is, of course,
an open question.
If the Court accepts the Eleventh
Circuit's implicit holding that a
state's failure to delegate law
enforcement authority to county
governments immunizes those gov-
ernments from responsibility for the
county sheriff's actions, local gov-
ernments lacking home rule author-
ity in other states could be immu-
nized from liability for actions on
the part of their sheriffs when they
have not been so absolved in the
past. As with a holding that
Alabama sheriffs are not county offi-
cials, this conclusion could be seen
as an incentive for states to formally
deny county governments any law
enforcement authority as a way of
restricting Section 1983 liability.
On the other hand, if the Court
overturns the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit in this case, that
decision also will have few immedi-
ate consequences since it appears
that in most jurisdictions county
sheriffs are deemed to be county
policymakers for purposes of county
liability under Section 1983. Only
in states such as Alabama and, per-
haps, Wisconsin where sheriffs have
been held not to be county policy-
makers will the liability of local
governments be expanded.
This case also may provide valuable
insight into how much deference
the Court will accord to formal state
constitutional arrangements, partic-
ularly when they vary from the form
ordinarily encountered in municipal
and county liability cases.
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